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THE SUPREME COURT LIMITS CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS' CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS IN
CONFESSION CASES: COLORADO v. CONNELLY
The admissibility of confessions in criminal proceedings is one of the
most vigorously debated areas of constitutional criminal procedure. Even
though this subject has attracted much judicial attention, the law surround-
ing it is inconsistent and unclear. More than twenty years after Miranda
v. Arizona, I the United States Supreme Court remains uncertain about how
an accused's state of mind should affect the admissibility of his confession.
In Colorado v. Connelly,2 the Supreme Court held that an incriminating
statement made by an insane defendant is "voluntary" and that an insane
person can validly waive his Miranda rights, as long as no police misconduct
exists. The Connelly decision requires a defendant to show police coercion
or misconduct as a prerequisite to finding a confession involuntary3 and,
therefore, inadmissible. In addition, Connelly requires a showing of police
coercion or misconduct before a Miranda waiver can be found invalid.4
Prior to Connelly, police misconduct was one important factor in the
"totality of all the circumstances" 5 that courts were instructed to examine
before finding that a confession was voluntary, 6 or that a valid Miranda
waiver' was made.
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. 107 S. Ct. 515 (1986).
3. Involuntary refers to noncustodial confessions that fail to meet the requirements for
admissibility under the due process "voluntariness" test. See W. LAFAVE & J. IsREAL, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 6.2, at 442 (1984) [hereinafter LAFAvE].
4. Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 522. A Miranda waiver is invalid or ineffective if
the prosecution fails to prove that the waiver was made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444.
5. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
6. See Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961) (each factor in company with all
the surrounding circumstances-attitude of police towards defendant, defendant's physical and
mental state, and the diverse pressures that affect the defendant's power of resistance and self-
control-is relevant); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960) (range of the voluntariness
inquiry "must be broad, and [the Supreme] Court has insisted that the judgment in each instance
be based upon consideration of 'the totality of the circumstances' " (quoting Fikes v. Alabama,
352 U.S. 191, 197 (1957)); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (defendant's will found
overborne after considering all the facts); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957) (totality of
circumstances preceding the confessions went beyond allowable limits of due process). See also
C. WHTEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIs OF CASES AND CONCEPTS 360-62 (2d ed.
1986) (listing cases supporting the proposition that the Court has based its decisions on the
totality of the circumstances).
7. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986) ("Only if the 'totality of circumstances
surrounding the interrogation' reveals both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of
comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived."
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Connelly set important precedent because the Supreme Court decided
that police misconduct is the only criterium that can render a confession
involuntary or a Miranda waiver invalid. The Connelly Court completely
disregarded the totality of the circumstances standard without articulating
any reasons for the change. Courts are now instructed to disregard a
defendant's mental state when determining the voluntariness of a confession
or the validity of a Miranda waiver. Courts, therefore, will no longer
consider a defendant's free will by making a subjective examination of his
mental state. Thus, the constitutional rights of the accused, especially those
of the mentally incompetent, cannot adequately be protected.
The law surrounding interrogation and the admissibility of confessions
is extremely important because it involves the fundamental rights of an
accused person under the United States Constitution.' This Note will discuss
the relevant history and background of confession law in the United States.
Second, it will analyze the due process voluntariness standard and the
evolution of the Miranda doctrine. Third, this Note will examine the state
of confession law prior to the Connelly decision and the probable impact
that Connelly will have on future confession cases.
There are two issues that this Note will not discuss, although they should
be considered when evaluating the future impact of the Connelly decision
on a suspect's Miranda rights. First, the Court did not limit its review to
the issue of Connelly's unsolicited statements as presented by the prose-
cution in its petition for certiorari. 9 Instead, the Court requested that the
(quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1975)). See also Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S 104, 116
(1985) ("[Ilt reflects the Court's consistently held view that the admissibility of a confession
turns as much on ... the techniques for extracting the statements, . . . as on whether the
defendant's will was in fact overborne."), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 585 (1986); Edwards v.
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981) (valid Miranda waiver depends on particular facts and
circumstances including background, experience, and conduct of the accused); North Carolina
v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374-75 (1979) (waiver must be determined on the particular facts and
circumstances including background and conduct of the accused).
8. These rights include: the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the sixth
amendment right to counsel, and the fourteenth amendment right to fundamental fairness under
the due process clause.
9. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, 14, Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. 515 (1986)
(No. 85-660), cert. granted, 474 U.S. 1050 (1986). See Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 531
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Colorado v. Connelly, 474 U.S. 1050, 1051-52 (1986).
In Colorado v. Connelly, 474 U.S. at 1050, Justices Brennan and Stevens expressed concern
over the Court's efforts to assist prosecutors. "This grant of certiorari is yet another instance
supporting the concern that the Court shows an unseemly eagerness to act as 'the adjunct of
the State and its prosecutors in facilitating efficient and expedient conviction ....... Id. at
1050 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 462-63 (1985)). Justices
Brennan and Stevens noted that "[t]he prosecutor carefully limited his petition to this Court to
challenge only the suppression of respondent's initial, unsolicited statements. The petition ex-
pressly states that '[respondent's] later confession, which involves a Miranda issue, is not an
issue in this petition.' " Id. at 1052.
Justice Brennan commented that under Supreme Court Rule 21.1(a) " '[o]nly the questions
set forth in the petition or fairly included therein will be considered by the Court.' Given
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parties also brief the issue of whether or not Connelly's mental condition
rendered his Miranda waiver ineffective. In addition, the Court unilaterally
decided to consider the burden of proof that the prosecution must establish
in order to show that a defendant validly waived his Miranda rights.10
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court decided its first confession case, Hopt v. Utah," in
1884. Hopt was decided on federal evidentiary grounds rather than con-
stitutional grounds because the Supreme Court did not find it necessary to
petitioner's express disclaimer that the Miranda issue is presented, that question obviously is not
'fairly included' in the question submitted." Id. .at 1052. Justice Brennan concluded that "in
asking the parties to address issues that the State chose not to present in the petition for certiorari,
the Court goes beyond a mere philosophic inclination to facilitate criminal prosecution: the Court
gives the appearance of being not merely the champion, but actually an arm of the prosecution."
Id. at 1052. Justice Brennan believed that "the Court must be ever mindful of its primary role
as the protector of the citizen and not the warden or the prosecutor." Id. (quoting Florida v.
Meyers, 466 U.S. 380, 387 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
10. Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 522-23. The state court held that the prosecution's
burden of proving a valid Miranda waiver must be by "clear and convincing evidence." Id. at
522. The Supreme Court disagreed with this standard and stated that "although we have stated
in passing that the State bears a 'heavy' burden in proving waiver . . . we have never held that
the 'clear and convincing evidence' standard is the appropriate one." Id. The Court cited Lego
v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 486-90 (1972), to show that it had found a confession voluntary based
on a preponderance of the evidence. The Connelly Court explained that it upheld the lowest.
standard of proof for two reasons. "First, the voluntariness determination has nothing to do
with reliability of jury verdicts; rather, it is designed to determine the presence of police coercion.
Thus, voluntariness is irrelevant to the presence or absence of a crime, which must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt .... Second, .. . 'evidence is kept from the trier of guilt or
innocence for reasons wholly apart from enhancing the reliability of [jury] verdicts.' " Colorado
v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 522 (quoting Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. at 488).
The Connelly dissent strongly asserted that by lowering the prosecution's burden of proving
an effective Miranda waiver, "the Court ignores the explicit command of Miranda." 107 S. Ct.
at 531 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Because the due process clause and the fifth amendment
protections are so important, the Supreme Court has characterized the prosecution's burden of
proving a valid Miranda waiver as "great" or "heavy" and that by "[i]mposing the weakest
possible burden of proof for waiver of Miranda's right to counsel plainly ignores this precedent."
Id. Justice Brennan pointed out that in Lego, the Supreme Court held that the voluntariness
determination had nothing to do with reliability because at that time all involuntary confessions
were excluded. Id. at 532. In Connelly, however, the Supreme Court changed the voluntariness
standard so that now, "involuntary" confessions that do not result from police misconduct are
no longer excluded under the voluntariness standard. Id. According to Justice Brennan, therefore,
the reliability of confessions that were not a concern to the Lego Court, "should now become
a major concern in the admission of such confessions ... [for which] proof beyond a reasonable
doubt constitutes the appropriate standard." Id.
I1. 110 U.S. 574, 585 (1884) (presumption that one who is innocent will not act against his
best interests by making an untrue statement ceases when the confession appears to have been
made pursuant to inducements, threats, or promises which play on the fears and hopes of the
defendant and deprive him of free will or self-control essential to make his confession voluntarily).
19881
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make confession admissibility a constitutional issue.' 2 The Supreme Court
continued to decide federal confession cases under evidence laws until 1894
when it decided Brain v. United States3 under the fifth amendment of the
United States Constitution. The Supreme Court in Brain changed the basis
for deciding confession cases from evidentiary to constitutional grounds
and in so doing, provided the defendant with constitutional protections
that previously were never available in confession cases.
The Supreme Court did not review a state confession case until 1936
when it decided Brown v. Mississippi.14 The Court was unable to decide
Brown under the fifth amendment because the amendment did not apply
to the states until 1964.1 Instead, the Brown Court based its decision on
another constitutional ground, the fundamental fairness requirement of the
fourteenth amendment's due process clause.' 6 The defendants in Brown
were convicted based on confessions they gave after they were brutally
beaten.'7 The Court struck down the convictions because the method of
interrogation and the use of the confessions at trial represented a denial
of due process." In a subsequent case, the Supreme Court ruled that the
mere use of such a confession, whether or not it was a basis for conviction,
was unconstitutional. 9 The fourteenth amendment due process standard
12. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. at 583-84 ("It is unnecessary in this case that we should lay
down any general rule on the subject [because the admission of the statement] can be sustained
upon grounds which, according to the weight of authority, are sufficient to admit confessions
made by the accused to one in authority.").
13. 168 U.S. 532 (1897) (defendant's confession made while in custody and stripped of his
clothing was found not free and voluntary and held inadmissible). The Court stated, "In criminal
trials, in the courts of the United States, wherever a question arises whether a confession is
incompetent because not voluntary, the issue is controlled by that portion of the Fifth Amendment
... commanding that no person 'shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself.' " Id. at 542 (quoting U.S. CoNsT. amend. V).
14. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
15. The fifth amendment was not applicable to the several states until the Supreme Court's
decision in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
16. See LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 6.1, at 437. The Connelly Court noted that the due process
focus continues to be used even though the fifth amendment is applicable to the states. 107 S.
Ct. at 520.
17. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. at 281-82.
18. Id. at 286. As the Brown Court stated, the conduct of the police was "revolting to the
sense of justice." Id.
19. See Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958). Payne held that the confession of a "mentally
dull" nineteen year old Negro with a fifth grade education was involuntary because the defendant
was held for three days with little food and water and told that a mob was waiting to get him
unless he told the truth. Id. at 568. The Court found that
where . . . a coerced confession constitutes a part of the evidence before the jury
and a general verdict is returned, no one can say what credit and weight the jury
gave to the confession .... [E]ven though there may have been sufficient evidence,
apart from the coerced confession . . . the admission . . . of the coerced confession
vitiates the judgment because it violates the ... Fourteenth Amendment.
[Vol. 37:259
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became known as the "voluntariness" test,20 and mandated that the use
of an involuntary confession in a state criminal trial rendered the resulting
conviction invalid. 21
As the Supreme Court reviewed additional state confession cases, it
expanded the types of factors it examined under the due process voluntar-
iness doctrine. These factors included not only physical brutality by police, 22
but also false promises, 2a threats, 24 extended periods of interrogation, 25 and
police trickery. 26 In addition, the Supreme Court considered whether any
of a defendant's subjective characteristics impaired his ability to resist
external pressures that worked against his free will and caused him to
confess. 27 The subjective factors considered by the Court included physical
injury,2" mental illness 29 or deficiency,30 education level, a" age3 2 and ab-
normalities caused by drugs.33
In two important decisions the Supreme Court considered a number of
subjective factors and found that the confessions were involuntary even
though there was no evidence of police misconduct. In Blackburn v.
Alabama,34 the Court reversed a conviction because the defendant was
20. The "voluntariness" test is a tool that the courts use to determine whether or not a
confession is the product of a defendant's free will, and thus voluntary and admissible, or
"involuntary" and thus inadmissible. Courts determine voluntariness by examining the totality
of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, including police conduct and the character-
istics of the accused. See C. WBrr AD, supra note 6, at 358-63.
21. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
22. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
23. Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897) (confession obtained by any direct or implied
promises is not voluntary).
24. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961) (confession held involuntary where police
threatened to take defendant's wife into custody for questioning).
25. Leydra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954) (confession found involuntary when defendant
was subjected to many hours of day and night questioning by a state employed psychiatrist who
used suggestive questioning, threats, and promises); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944)
(confession found involuntary because police held defendant incommunicado and subjected him
to thirty-six hours of continuous questioning).
26. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (confession ruled involuntary because candidate
at police academy, who was a close friend of the defendant, told defendant that he (the candidate)
would get into trouble if defendant refused to confess).
27. See LAFAvE, supra note 3, § 6.2, at 448.
28. Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35 (1967) (confession found involuntary because police,
after shooting defendant in the leg, ordered him at gun point to admit his guilt or be killed).
29. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960) (defendant found most probably insane at
the time he confessed); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957) (defendant was schizophrenic and
highly suggestible).
30. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961) (defendant found mentally defective).
31. Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707 (1967) (defendant had only a fifth grade education);
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961) (defendant was illiterate).
32. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) (defendant was a fifteen year old boy).
33. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) (murder confession found involuntary because
defendant heroin addict was given an injection with a drug having the effect of a truth serum
which caused his will to be overborne at the time he confessed).
34. 361 U.S. 199 (1960).
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found "most probably insane and incompetent" on the day he confessed. 35
The Blackburn Court, referring to the Court's decision in Brown v. Mis-
sissippi,36 stated that "the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark
of an unconstitutional inquisition. '3 7 The Blackburn Court held that, as
in Brown, the evidence established that the confession was most likely not
the product of any meaningful act of volition. 31
Likewise, in Townsend v. Sain,3 9 the Court found a confession to be
involuntary when a mentally defective defendant was given an injection of
a drug with the properties of a truth serum.4 0 Even though the interrogating
police officers were unaware that the defendant had been given the drug,
the Townsend Court reversed the conviction stating that "[a]ny questioning
by police officers which in fact produces a confession which is not the
product of a free intellect renders that confession inadmissible. '41 The
decisions in Blackburn and Townsend, therefore, indicated that the Court
was moving away from merely examining physical abuse by police officers.
Consequently, the Court further expanded the range of subjective factors
it would consider in the voluntariness analysis. As a result, the scope of
the voluntariness test 42 was expanded and the Court considered the totality
of the circumstances that surrounded each specific case 3.4
When courts use the totality of the circumstances test to determine
whether or not a confession is voluntary, no one factor controls the inquiry,
but rather, all relevant factors are considered.4 4 The Supreme Court, how-
ever, never articulated a standard for determining which factors should
35. Id. at 203.
36. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
37. 361 U.S. at 206. "A prolonged interrogation of an accused who is ignorant of his rights
.. . is not infrequently an effective technique of terror. Thus the range of inquiry in this type
of case must be broad, and this Court has insisted that the judgment in each instance be based
upon consideration of 'the totality of the circumstances.' " Id. (quoting Fikes v. Alabama, 352
U.S. 191, 197 (1957)).
38. 361 U.S. at 205.
39. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
40. Id. at 307-08.
41. Id. at 308 (emphasis in original).
42. See LAFAvE, supra note 3, § 6.2, at 444.
43. See supra note 37. See also LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 6.2, at 444 (court's consideration
of totality of the circumstances must include careful assessment of defendant's status and all
relevant characteristics).
44. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. at 601-02.
It is impossible for this Court . . . to attempt precisely to delimit, or to surround
with specific, all-inclusive restrictions, the power of interrogation allowed to state
law enforcement officers in obtaining confessions. No single litmus-paper test for
constitutionally impermissible interrogation has been evolved .... Each of [the]
factors, in company with of all the surrounding circumstances-the duration ... of
detention ... the . . . attitude of the police toward [the defendant], his physical and
mental state, the diverse pressures which sap . . . his powers of resistance and self-
control-is relevant.
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receive more weight or should be scrutinized more carefully. As a result,
the state courts have reached inconsistent results and the test has proved
to be unworkable 5.4  Furthermore, the test provided a poor standard for
police to follow regarding permissible interrogation. 6 In cases of extreme
police brutality, the voluntariness test was easily satisfied. As the Supreme
Court objected to more subtle forms of police misconduct, 47 however, the
totality of the circumstances test did not provide a clear standard against
which a court could judge zealous police interrogation of suspects. 41
In 1966, the Supreme Court, dissatisfied with the voluntariness test,
significantly changed its course with respect to state confession cases. 49 In
Miranda v. Arizona,50 the Supreme Court created an objective standard
for lower courts and law enforcement officials to follow. Under the Mir-
anda doctrine, each defendant subjected to custodial interrogation5 must
be warned prior to any questioning that he has a right to remain silent,
that any statements he makes may be used as evidence against him, and
that he has a right to an attorney.52 A defendant may waive any or all of
45. Dix, Mistake, Ignorance, Expectation of Benefit, and the Modem Law of Confessions,
1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 275, 293-94 (state courts continued to struggle with the question of what
representations invalidated a statement). See also Note, Oregon v. Elstad: Boldly Stepping
Backwards to Pre-Miranda Days, 35 CATH. U.L. REV. 245, 250-51 (1985).
Because application of the [voluntariness] doctrine required an evaluation of all
relevant aspects of each challenged confession, and because the Supreme Court was
unable to articulate precise decisional standards, cases among the state courts achieved
inconsistent results .... By leaving state courts with an imprecise standard, the
Supreme Court invited judges to employ their subjective preferences in the volun-
tariness evaluation.
Note, supra, at 250-51.
46. Dix, supra note 45, at 294. See also LAFAvE, supra note 3, § 6.2, at 450 (standard which
varied from case to case depending on subjective characteristics of the suspect is not likely to
have much impact on police); Schulhofer, Book Review, 79 MIcH. L. REv. 865, 869 (1981)
(reviewing KAhuSAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CoNFEssIoNs: ESSAYS IN LAW AND POLICY (1980))
(because voluntariness test was vague and insisted on assessing totality of the circumstances, it
gave no guidance to police officers). But see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 506 (Harlan,
J., dissenting) (due process voluntariness cases show that there exists a workable and effective
means of dealing with confessions under this standard).
47. See supra notes 23-26.
48. Dix, supra note 45, at 294, 296 (totality of circumstances test provided a poor vehicle
for developing specific legal rules for police interrogators to follow because decisions rested on
combined effect of several factors and the Court failed to accurately address each factor
individually).
49. Gardner, The Emerging Good Faith Exception to the Miranda Rule-A Critique, 35
HASTINGS L.J. 429, 446-48 (1984).
50. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (confessions were held inadmissible where defendants were custodially
interrogated without being fully apprised of their rights to remain silent and to have an attorney
present during questioning).
51. Id. at 444 ("By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way.").
52. Id. This is commonly known as the Miranda warning.
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these rights provided that the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently.' 3
The Miranda rule was designed to be easily applied and effective in
reducing inappropriate interrogation.14 The rule differed significantly from
the totality of the circumstances test because the latter attempted to deal
directly with interrogation methods and a defendant's mental state in
relation to resulting confessions. In contrast, the Miranda doctrine was
essentially a protective device that the Court created to curtail the under-
lying problem of the inherent compulsion in custodial settings." The Court
reasoned that such compulsion undermined an individual's will to resist
and compelled him to speak when he would not otherwise do so freely.' 6
Although the Miranda decision did not solve all of the problems of the
voluntariness standard, the ruling provided guidance for the police by
giving them a "bright line' '57 rule to follow.' Miranda, however, is limited
to those situations that involve confessions obtained through custodial
interrogation. 9 Consequently, the voluntariness test is still important be-
53. Id. at 479. See also Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95 (1984) (court may admit confession
only if defendant knowingly and intelligently waived Miranda rights); New York v. Quarles, 467
U.S. 649, 662 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (defendant could waive rights provided waiver
was made knowingly and intelligently); Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 647 (1984) (waiver of
right to counsel must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent); Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S.
1039, 1046 (1983) (valid Miranda waiver depends on whether the purported waiver was knowing
and intelligent and found to be so under the totality of the circumstances); Edwards v. Arizona,
451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981) ("[Wlaivers of counsel must not only be voluntary, but must also
constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege
.... ").
54. Dix, supra note 45, at 297 (rule was considered to be objective, easy to apply, and able
to reduce inappropriate interrogation).
55. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 458 ("Unless adequate protective devices are employed
to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the
defendant can truly be the product of his free choice.").
56. Id. at 467.
57. Id. at 471-72 ("[The Miranda] warning is an absolute prerequisite to [custodial] inter-
rogation. No amount of circumstantial evidence that the person may have been aware of this
right will suffice to stand it on its stead."). See also Note, supra note 45, at 253 (by holding
that all statements obtained in violation of Miranda are a product of coercion and hence
inadmissible, Court set forth a "bright line" rule to be applied in every such instance). But see
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656-57 (1984) (there is a "public safety" exception to the
Miranda rule that warnings be given before a suspect's answers may be admitted into evidence).
58. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444. "[Tihe prosecution may not use statements ...
stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of
procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." Id. See also
Schulhofer, supra note 46, at 878-80 (any custodial interrogation, no matter how brief or polite,
involves excessive pressure unless suspect first received Miranda warning and knowingly waived
his right to remain silent). But see Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318 (1985) (failure to give
Miranda warnings before an initial statement was made did not bar admissibility of a second
statement made shortly thereafter because it was preceded by a warning and waiver).
59. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 37:259
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cause it applies to statements obtained outside the realm of custodial
interrogation.- More importantly, by allowing a defendant to waive his
rights, the Miranda Court continued to use the totality of the circumstances
test to determine whether a defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelli-
gently waived those rights. 6'
In cases decided since Miranda, the Court has stressed the importance
of both a defendant's competence 62 and police conduct 63 under the totality
of the circumstances test.6 When waiver is at issue, a defendant's com-
petency is relevant to the question of whether or not he knowingly and
intelligently 65 waived his rights, while police conduct is relevant to the
60. See, e.g., California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125-26 (1983) (Miranda warnings not
required where suspect voluntarily came to police station and left unhindered by police after a
brief interview); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 247 (1973) (Miranda warnings not
required before investigative questioning of a person not in custody); Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. at 458 (Miranda warnings are designed to combat the inherent compulsion of custodial
interrogation). See also Schulhofer, supra note 46, at 877 (Miranda safeguards are inapplicable
to police questioning of suspects not in custody and questioning by private parties even in
custody-like situations).
61. See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724-25 (1979) (determination of whether statements
obtained during custodial interrogation are admissible is to be made by inquiring into totality
of the circumstances surrounding interrogation to ascertain whether defendant knowingly and
voluntarily decided to waive his rights). See also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 475-77
("[L]engthy interrogation or incommunicado incarceration before a statement is made is strong
evidence that the accused did not validly waive his rights .... Moreover, any evidence that the
accused was threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver will, of course, show that the defendant
did not voluntarily waive his privilege."); Dix, supra note 45, at 326-27 (under the test for a
proper Miranda waiver, the Court simply reintroduced a slightly modified form of its voluntariness
inquiry).
62. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422 (1986) ("Nor is there any question about
respondent's comprehension of the full panoply of rights set out in the Miranda warnings and
of the potential consequences of a decision to relinquish them."); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S.
477, 484 (1981) (confession suppressed because state courts did not focus on whether defendant
understood his Miranda rights); Tague v. Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469, 470 (1980) (showing defen-
dant's competency is part of "heavy burden" to be carried by the government); North Carolina
v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374-75 (1979) (waiver must be determined from the particular facts and
circumstances, including background, experience, and conduct of accused); Fare v. Michael C.,
442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979) (determination of a valid Miranda waiver includes evaluation of
defendant's age, experience, education, background, intelligence, and whether he has the capacity
to understand the warnings given to him).
63. See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 116 (1985) (Court has consistently held that admis-
sibility of a confession turns as much on the propriety of the methods used to extract the
statement as on whether defendant's will was overborne), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 585 (1986);
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (confession found invalid because defendant was subjected
to lengthy interrogation while incapacitated in an intensive care unit); Greenwald v. Wisconsin,
390 U.S. 519 (1968) (confession found invalid because defendant was interrogated for over
eighteen hours without food or sleep); Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35 (1967) (confession
found invalid because police held a gun to the head of a wounded defendant to obtain a
confession).
64. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
65. See LAFAvH, supra note 3, § 6.9, at 529.
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question of whether or not the waiver was voluntary. 66 The Supreme Court
in Moran v. Burbine? applied the waiver standard, first articulated in
Johnson v. Zerbst,68 to the Miranda warning. This standard has two distinct
dimensions. First, the waiver must be "voluntary" in the sense that it is a
product of free and deliberate choice rather than coercion.6 9 Second, the
waiver must be "knowing" and "intelligent" to the extent that it is made
with full awareness of both the nature of the rights and the consequences
of abandoning those rights. 70
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not specifically defined the terms
"voluntary," "knowing," or "intelligent" with respect to Miranda waiv-
ers. However, the Court did discuss Miranda waivers in Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 71 a search and seizure case decided in 1973. In Schneckloth
the Court stated that a Miranda waiver is similar to the waiver of other
rights necessary to assure a fair trial and, therefore, it requires that a
defendant be aware of his rights before he can effectively waive them.
72
The Court held that such awareness is a necessary prerequisite for a valid
Miranda waiver. 7" The majority in Schneckloth regarded Miranda as estab-
lishing an awareness requirement both for the right to remain silent and
the right to counsel during interrogation. 74 Such requirements were not
found in the due process voluntariness test.
7
Supreme Court decisions strongly suggest a desire to insure that confes-
sors make a fully informed and reasoned choice before deciding to confess.
76
The Schneckloth and Moran decisions strongly suggest that courts must
focus on a defendant's conscious awareness of his rights when they deter-
mine whether or not a Miranda waiver is voluntary. Arguably, a major
objective of confession law is to assure that a confessor speaks with a
complete understanding of his position. 77
66. Id.
67. 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
68. 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) ("A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege. The determination of whether there has been an
intelligent waiver ... must depend ... upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding
the case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.").
69. 475 U.S. at 421.
70. Id. See also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 488 (1981) (a waiver is an abandonment
of a known right).
71. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
72. Id. at 235 (defendant's awareness must rise to the level of an intentional relinquishment
or abandonment of a known right). See supra note 4 and accompanying text. See also Johnson
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver
of a fundamental constitutional right; waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege).
73. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 240.
74. See Dix, supra note 45, at 313.
75. See id.
76. Id. at 331.
77. Id. at 313.
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II. COLORADO v. CONNELLY
A. Factual and Procedural Background
On August 18, 1983, the defendant Francis Barney Connelly told a
Denver policeman that "he had killed someone" and wanted to talk about
it.78 The officer asked Connelly whether he had ever received any treatment
for mental disorders and Connelly stated that he had. 79 He then was taken
into custody and read his Miranda rights.8 0 The defendant stated that he
understood his rights and elaborated further on his initial statements."
Connelly stated that he had killed a young girl and he showed the police
the scene where the killing occurred. 2 He was charged with murder but
the court determined that he was incompetent to stand trial. 3 After Con-
nelly spent six months in a mental hospital, the court found him competent
to stand trial.8 4
At trial, a court-appointed psychiatrist stated that Connelly's statements
on August 18 were not voluntary.85 The psychiatrist testified that on the
day before the confession Connelly began to experience the voice of God
telling him to confess his crime to the police.8 6 He obeyed the "voice" and
travelled from Boston to Denver. Once he arrived in Denver, he considered
returning home but God's voice told him that he had only two options: to
confess to the crime or to commit suicide.8 7 Obeying this voice, Connelly
found a police officer and confessed.88 According to the psychiatrist, he
suffered from chronic paranoid schizophrenia and his statements to the
police resulted from "command auditory hallucinations. 89 The psychiatrist
78. People v. Connelly, 702 P.2d 722, 724 (Colo. 1985).
79. Id. at 725. The nature of Connelly's statement prompted the officer to ask him whether
he had received any previous mental treatment. Id. Connelly had been hospitalized five times
prior to his confession. Brief for Respondent at 1, Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. 515 (1986)
(No. 85-660).
80. People v. Connelly, 702 P.2d at 725.
81. Id.
82. Id. The defendant told the officer that he killed Mary Anne Junta, with whom he had
been travelling, in November of 1982.
83. Id. at 724. Incompetent to proceed means that the defendant is suffering from a mental
disease or defect that renders him incapable of understanding the nature and course of proceedings
against him. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 16-8-102 (1978).
84. People v. Connelly, 702 P.2d at 724.
85. Id. at 725. The psychiatric opinion was based partly on Connelly's history which the
psychiatrist elicited during a competency evaluation. Id.
86. Id. The psychiatrist testified that the voice told Connelly to travel to Denver from Boston
and confess the crime to the police. Connelly obeyed and purchased an airplane ticket the evening
of August 17, 1983, the day before he confessed. Id.
87. Id. It was at this point that Connelly went to downtown Denver and confessed to the
first policeman he saw. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. (hallucinations of this type make the person feel "as if they have to act on whatever.
the voice is telling them.") (emphasis added).
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stated that Connelly was unable to make a free and intelligent decision
about whether to confess to the police. 90
The Colorado state court granted Connelly's suppression motion. 91 It
found that he did not exercise his free will in choosing to speak to the
police, but rather, he was compelled to confess due to his illness. 92 The
court held that the prosecution failed to prove that the initial statement
was voluntarily made under the due process standard. 93 The court further
held that the statements Connelly made after he was taken into custody
were not the result of a valid waiver of his Miranda rights. 94 The entire
confession was suppressed and the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed. 95
The State of Colorado petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a
writ of certiorari, which the Court granted. 96 The Supreme Court reversed
and remanded the Colorado Supreme Court 97 decision on both the volun-
tariness of Connelly's initial statements and the validity of his Miranda
waiver.
B. Majority Holding
The majority opinion was delivered by Chief Justice Rehnquist who first
concluded that the admissibility of Connelly's statements should be gov-
erned by state rules of evidence, rather than by the Court's previous
decisions regarding coerced confessions and Miranda waivers. 9 The Court
stated that confession cases decided in the last fifty years have focused on
police misconduct99 and in the absence of police misconduct, there is simply
no basis for finding that any state actor has deprived a criminal defendant
of due process of law.1°°
The majority asserted that a defendant's mental state, by itself, should
never conclude the voluntariness inquiry. 01 According to Chief Justice
90. Id. (Connelly was "compelled by his illness to do that which he did") (emphasis added).
91. Id. The court granted this motion even though it noted that the police had advised the
defendant of his Miranda rights, that the defendant had stated that he understood his rights,
and that the police had not acted improperly in speaking to the defendant. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. The court found the statements involuntary because the defendant's psychosis com-
pelled him to follow the mandate of God and confess rather than kill himself. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Colorado v. Connelly, 474 U.S. 1050 (1986).
97. Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. 515, 524 (1986).
98. Id. at 522-23.
99. Id. at 520 n.1 ("While each confession case has turned on its own set of factors ... all
have contained a substantial element of coercive police conduct."). But see 107 S. Ct. at 527-
28 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("While it is true that police overreaching has been an element
of every confession case to date .... it is also true that in every case the Court has made clear
that ensuring that a confession is a product of free will is an independent concern .... The
fact that involuntary confessions have always been excluded in part because of police overreaching
signifies only that this is a case of first impression.") (footnotes omitted).




Rehnquist, if the inquiry could be determined solely by examining a de-
fendant's mental state, the result would expand the range of voluntariness
cases and require the courts to determine a defendant's motivation for
speaking even in the absence of police coercion. 0 2 The majority cited
Blackburn v. Alabama and Townsend v. Sain,03 which involved defendants
with diminished capacities, and stated that although mental condition is
relevant, the "state of mind can never conclude the due process inquiry."'04
Chief Justice Rehnquist contended that the Colorado courts failed to
recognize the essential link between the coercive activity of police and the
resulting confession. 105 Suppressing Connelly's statements would serve ab-
solutely no purpose in enforcing constitutional guarantees because there
was no police misconduct to deter. 106 The majority concluded the due
process portion of the holding by stating that coercive police activity is a
necessary predicate to finding a confession involuntary within the meaning
of the due process clause.10 7
With respect to the Miranda waiver issue, the majority stated that the
Colorado Supreme Court erred by importing notions of free will into an
area of constitutional law which "have no place there."' 0 Chief Justice
Rehnquist reasoned that the fifth amendment is not concerned with moral
or psychological pressures to confess unless caused by official coercion. °9
The Connelly Court concluded that the voluntariness of a Miranda waiver
has always depended on the absence of police overreaching, not on free
choice."10
Connelly, in the eyes of Chief Justice Rehnquist, urged the Court to
adopt a "free will" rationale."' The Chief Justice reasoned that such a
rationale would find an attempted waiver invalid any time a defendant felt
102. Id. at 521. But see Hayes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515 (1963) (Court cannot escape
the demand of judging or making difficult appraisals inherent in determining whether constitu-
tional rights have been violated).
103. Townsend v. San, 372 U.S. 293, 307-08 (1963) (defendant injected with a drug having
the effect of truth serum before he confessed); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960)
(defendant most probably insane at the time he confessed).
104. Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 521.
105. Id.
106. Id. According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, the purpose of excluding evidence seized in
violation of the Constitution is to "substantially deter future violations of the Constitution ....
Only if we were to establish a brand new constitutional right-the right of a criminal defendant
to confess to hig crime only when totally rational and properly motivated-could respondent's
present claim be sustained." Id.
107. Id. at 522.
108. Id. at 523. "There is obviously no reason to require more in the way of a 'voluntariness'
inquiry in the Miranda waiver context than in the fourteenth amendment confession context."
Id.
109. Id. at 523. The sole concern of the fifth amendment, the basis of Miranda, is government
coercion. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 524.
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compelled to confess, even if the compulsion did not flow from the police." 2
Miranda, the majority contended, protects defendants only from govern-
ment coercion. Therefore, the respondent's schizophrenic perception is a
matter to which the United States Constitution does not speak." 3
C. Concurrence/Dissent
Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion, agreed with the Colorado
Supreme Court that Connelly's pre-custodial statements were involuntary." 1 4
Nonetheless, since these statements were not the product of compulsion,
he believed that they did not violate the fifth amendment." 5 The fact that
the statements were involuntary did not mean that their use at trial was
fundamentally unfair or a denial of due process."1
6
Justice Stevens, however, dissented from the majority opinion regarding
the post-custodial statements." 17 According to Justice Stevens, once the
custodial relationship was established, the questioning automatically as-
sumed a presumptively coercive character" 8 and questioning could not
continue without a valid waiver. Since it was undisputed that Connelly was
unfit for trial, Justice Stevens concluded that he was not competent to
waive his Miranda rights 19 and, therefore, his post-custodial statements
should have been inadmissible. 20
D. The Dissents
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, filed a dissenting opinion.
Justice Brennan first stated that the majority's decision in Connelly was
unprecedented because it deprived Connelly of his fundamental right to
make a valid choice with a sane mind.' 2' The dissent asserted that the use
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 524 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The state trial court found
that the overwhelming evidence indicated that the prosecution failed to meet its burden of
demonstrating that Connelly's initial statement was voluntary. Id.
115. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("Although they well may be so
unreliable that they could not support a conviction.").
116. Id. at 525. But see Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 283 (1936) (failure of court to
exclude involuntary confessions is sufficient to reverse judgment).
117. Colorado v Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 525.
118. Id.
119. Id. In the trial court's estimate, the defendant at the time he confessed, had absolutely
no volition or choice to make; he was compelled by his illness to confess. Id. at 525 n.4.
120. Id. at 525 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("The Court seems to
believe that a waiver can be voluntary even if it is not the product of ... the defendant's 'free
will' .... The Court's position is not only incomprehensible ... it is also foreclosed by the
Court's recent pronouncement in Moran v. Burbine, [475 U.S. 412 (1986)].").
121. Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 525. "Surely in the present state of our civilization
a most basic sense of justice is affronted by the spectacle of incarcerating a human being upon
the basis of a statement he made while insane .... Id. (quoting Blackburn v. Alabama, 361
U.S. 199, 207 (1960)).
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of a mentally ill person's involuntary confession violates the fundamental
fairness notion in the due process clause. 22 Justice Brennan argued that
although there was no police misconduct, the evidence in the record estab-
lished that Connelly lacked the capacity to exercise free will in choosing
to talk to the police.' 23 The dissent concluded that the absence of police
misconduct should not, by itself, determine whether a confession is
voluntary 24 and that instead, a court must recognize the importance of a
defendant's ability to exercise his free will.' 25 The dissent, therefore, would
demand an inquiry into the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
confession, rather than focusing solely on police misconduct. 26
According to Justices Brennan and Marshall, the holding in Connelly
restricts a finding of an involuntary confession only to those situations
involving police misconduct. 27 Justice Brennan argued that the majority
failed to look at "all forms of involuntariness or coercion" and thus
refused to acknowledge the constitutional significance of free will. 2 He
further argued that the majority's assertion, that the respondent's claim
would require a new constitutional right, ignored 200 years of case law. 29
The dissent quoted Culombe v. Connecticut to explain that the ultimate
test of voluntariness is whether a confession is "the product of an essentially
free and unconstrained choice."' 130 Justice Brennan asserted that a true
commitment to fundamental fairness requires an inquiry into whether a
confession was free and voluntary and not merely whether there was police
misconduct.' 3 ' The cases since Brown v. Mississippi have focused on both
police misconduct and free will as necessary but separate concerns under
122. Id. at 526 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
123. Id. In his dissent, Justice Brennan cited the state trial court:
[Tihere's no question that the Defendant did not exercise free will in choosing to
talk to the police. He exercised a choice both [sic] of which were mandated by
auditory hallucination, had no basis in reality, and were the product of a psychotic
break with reality. The Defendant at the time of the confession had absolutely in





127. Id. at 526 (Brennan, J., dissenting). "Confessions by mentally ill individuals or by persons
coerced by parties other than police officers are now considered 'voluntary.' " Id. at 526-27.
128. Id. at 527. "But due process derives much of its meaning from a conception of
fundamental fairness that emphasizes the right to make vital choices voluntarily .... This right
requires vigilant protection if we are to safeguard the values of private conscience and human
dignity." Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. (citing Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961)).
131. Id. at 527 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("We have never confined our focus to police
coercion, because the value of freedom of will has demanded a broader inquiry."). See supra
notes 22-33, 42 and accompanying text.
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the totality of the circumstances test.' The dissent noted that until this
decision, the Court had never upheld the admission of a confession which
did not reflect the exercise of a defendant's free will. 33
Justice Brennan's final argument addressed the Miranda waiver issue.
He stated that Miranda waivers must be voluntary, but they also must be
knowing and intelligent. 34 Justice Brennan reasoned that a waiver must
have been made in full appreciation of both the nature of the rights and
the consequences of abandoning those rights. 13  Then, only if the totality
of the circumstances reveals both an uncoerced choice and the requisite
level of comprehension may a court properly find a valid waiver. 36 Justice
Brennan argued that the Colorado Supreme Court judgment should have
been affirmed because it found that Connelly was unable to make an
intelligent decision. 3 7
III. ANALYSIS
The Connelly decision will be examined in two parts. First, the pre-
custodial statements will be analyzed under the due process voluntariness
standard because the Miranda doctrine only applies to statements obtained
132. Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 527 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In a number of cases,
the Court made it clear that ensuring that a confession is the product of free will is an independent
concern. Id. See, e.g., Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 116 (1985), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 585
(1986) (Court has consistently held that admissibility of a confession turns as much on police
techniques as it does on whether defendant's will was overborne); Haynes v. Washington, 373
U.S. 503, 513 (1963) (use of threats violates due process and the question in each case is whether
defendant's will was overborne); Gallagos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962) (confessions
obtained from five day interrogation of a fourteen year old boy violated due process because
defendant could not know or assert his constitutional rights; suggests that a compound of two
influences can render a confession involuntary); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602
(1961) (duration and condition of detention as well as defendant's mental and physical state are
necessary inquiries in the voluntariness test); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 323 (1959)
(petitioner's will overborne by official pressure, fatigue, and sympathy falsely aroused); Fikes v.
Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957) (confession rendered involuntary because schizophrenic defendant
was interrogated continuously for several days). But see Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963)
(confession found involuntary because defendant had been injected with a drug, even though
questioning officers were unaware of the drug); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960)
(confession of a paranoid schizophrenic held involuntary even though no police misconduct
existed).
133. Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 528 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 533. See also Miranda v. Arizoha, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) ("The defendant may
waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently.").
135. Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 533 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Moran v.
Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986) ("Only if the 'totality of the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation' reveals both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a
court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived.").
136. Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 533 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
137. Id.
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pursuant to custodial interrogation. 3 s Second, the custodial statements will
be analyzed under the Miranda doctrine. 1 9
A. Pre-Custodial/Due Process Voluntariness Standard
In Colorado v. Connelly, 140 the Supreme Court drastically changed the
way courts will decide future confession cases. The Court disregarded years
of confession law history that determined the voluntariness of a confession
by asking whether it was the product of an essentially free and uncon-
strained choice by its maker.' 14 Prior to Connelly, the courts examined
voluntariness by considering the totality of the circumstances, including
police action and a defendant's physical and mental state, to uncover any
type of compulsion that might have compelled a defendant to confess.
142
The Court, under Connelly, restricts voluntariness inquiries only to those
situations where police misconduct causes a confession. 43 Without police
coercion there can be no finding of involuntariness and, therefore, no
violation of due process when a person's confession is admitted into
evidence. 14
This holding represents a major shift in the voluntariness test. The totality
of circumstances inquiry mandated both a subjective examination of a
defendant's mental state and an objective examination of the circumstances
surrounding an interrogation. 145 The Connelly decision completely discarded
the subjective examination and limited the objective inquiry. As a result,
courts now only examine whether or not there was police misconduct. 46
This portion of the analysis addresses the due process voluntariness portion
of the Connelly decision and concludes that the decision is contrary to
prior confession case law. 47
138. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
140. Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. 515 (1986).
141. See Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961).
142. Id. ("Each of these factors, in company with all the surrounding circumstances-the
duration and condition of detention ... [the defendant's] physical and mental state, the diverse
pressures which sap ... his powers of resistance and self control-is relevant.").
143. Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 521. The majority described this relationship as an
essential link between coercive state activity on the one hand, and the resulting confession from
the defendant on the other. Id.
144. Id. at 522.
145. See supra notes 20-48 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 98-113 and accompanying text.
147. A close reading of the Connelly decision and cases cited by the majority reveals that the
majority misquoted or quoted out of context passages from other cases. First, Chief Justice
Rehnquist stated that "[o]f course, a [Miranda] waiver must at a minimum be 'voluntary' to be
effective against the accused." 107 S. Ct. at 523 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 476). This
statement ignores the fact that the Miranda decision expressly required that a suspect's waiver
is valid only if made "voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
Furthermore, the Miranda Court stated that "any evidence that the accused was threatened,
1988]
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1. Police misconduct
The Connelly majority contended that the defendant's initial statements
to the police were voluntary because the record was void of any police
tricked or cajoled into a waiver will, of course, show that the defendant did not voluntarily
waive his privilege." Id. at 476. No legal scholar could reasonably infer that the Miranda decision
held that "voluntary" is the minimum standard for a valid waiver. Rather, the Miranda Court
held that the minimum standard is "voluntary" and "knowing" and "intelligent." These are
two separate concerns and both must be satisfied before a Miranda waiver is found valid. See
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986).
In addition, Chief Justice Rehnquist quoted two passages from Moran v. Burbine out of
context in an effort to support his position that police coercion is a necessary prerequisite for
finding a waiver invalid. The first passage stated that "the relinquishment of a right must have
been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than
intimidation, coercion or deception." Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 523 (quoting Moran,
475 U.S. at 421). The Chief Justice skipped to the next paragraph in the Moran decision and
finished his quote with, "The record is devoid of any suggestion that police resorted to physical
or psychological pressure to elicit the statements." Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 523
(quoting Moran, 475 U.S. at 421). Between the first and second sentences of this quote, the
Moran decision stated that besides being voluntary, a valid "waiver must have been made with
a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the
decision to abandon it. Only if the 'totality of circumstances surrounding the interrogation'
reveals both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly
conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived." Moran, 475 U.S. at 421 (emphasis added).
By quoting Moran out of context, Chief Justice Rehnquist set the stage for his successful
attack on the Miranda doctrine. First, he used the term "voluntary Miranda waiver" as the test
for an effective waiver instead of the term "valid Miranda waiver," as used by the Miranda
Court. In Miranda, a valid waiver was a broad concept that included inquiry into a suspect's
ability to voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive his rights. In contrast, the new Connelly
concept of a voluntary waiver is limited to situations evidencing police coercion.
Finally, Justice Rehnquist quoted only the portions of the Miranda decision that supported
his new waiver definition. Unfortunately, he left out the portions of Miranda that correctly
complete the doctrine because they refute his new definition. Indeed, it appears that the Chief
Justice intentionally confused the term "voluntary" with the term "valid" so that he could limit
the Miranda doctrine to require police misconduct for a valid waiver.
Chief Justice Rehnquist also stated "facts" about Townsend v. Sain that were in direct
contradiction to the findings of that Court. Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 521 (citing
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963)). In Townsend, the defendant was given a medication
with the properties of a truth serum to relieve his symptoms of heroin withdrawal and he
confessed. The Townsend Court found the confession involuntary and reversed the conviction.
In Connelly, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that Townsend was based on police misconduct
because "[t]he subsequent confession .. .[was] obtained by officers who knew that Townsend
.had been given drugs ...." 107 S. Ct. at 521. But, as the dissent in Connelly pointed out,
" 'the police [in Townsend] ... did not know what [medications] the doctor had given [the
defendant].' " Id. at 529 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Townsend, 372 U.S. at 299). In fact,
the Townsend Court indicated that police misconduct was not an essential factor when it stated
that "[i]t is not significant that the drug may have been administered and the questions asked
by persons unfamiliar with [the medication's] properties as a 'truth serum,' if these properties
exist. Any questioning by police officers which in fact produces a confession which is not the
product of free intellect renders that confession inadmissable. The Court has usually so stated
the test." 372 U.S. at 308 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
In other words, Chief Justice Rehnquist interpreted the Townsend decision as representing a
[Vol. 37:259
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misconduct or coercion.' 4s The Court held that police misconduct is a
necessary predicate to finding a confession involuntary.149 Although police
misconduct is an important factor, the voluntariness inquiry requires an
examination of a defendant's mental state as well. 50 Evidence of police
misconduct alone should not be determinative of the voluntariness in-
quiry."' Police misconduct and a defendant's mental capacity should be
considered together in light of all the relevant circumstances. 15 2 It has been
"the Court's consistently held view that the admissibility of a confession
turns as much on ... the techniques for extracting statements ...as on
whether the defendant's will was in fact overborne."' Instead of following
this precedent, the Connelly Court held that police misconduct is always
necessary before finding that a confession is not voluntary"54 and that free
will has no constitutional significance."'
Standing in direct contradiction to the Connelly holding, at least two prior
Supreme Court decisions indicated that, even in the absence of police
misconduct, certain factors could nevertheless render a confession invol-
untary.56 In Blackburn v. Alabama,"57 the Court threw out the confession
of a paranoid schizophrenic who was found "most probably insane" at
the time he confessed. 5 s The record was void of police misconduct during
the interrogation. 19 The Court, however, held that the absence of improper
case where the Court found police misconduct as the basis for its decision when, in fact, the
Townsend Court did not find police misconduct determinative. Furthermore, the Chief Justice
stated that police misconduct was an "integral element" in both Townsend and Blackburn v.
Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960), which Connelly had offered as instances where the Supreme
Court had found confessions involuntary based on mental state alone. Contrary to Chief Justice
Rehnquist's belief, however, the Townsend Court stated that "in Blackburn v. Alabama, ...
we held irrelevant the absence of evidence of improper purpose on the part of the questioning
officers." 372 U.S. at 309.
148. Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. 515, 524 (1986).
149. Id. at 522.
150. See supra notes 27-33, 42 and accompanying text.
151. See Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961) (each of the factors with all the
surrounding circumstances is relevant); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960) (range
of inquiry must be broad and based on the totality of circumstances); Fikes v. Alabama, 352
U.S. 191, 199 (1957) (no one factor should determine the "involuntariness" inquiry).
152. See supra notes 22-33, 42 and accompanying text.
153. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 116 (1985), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 585 (1986) (emphasis
added).
154. Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 522.
155. Id. at 523.
156. See generally Note, Development in the Law: Confessions, 79 HARv. L. REa. 935, 974
(1966) (realizing that the success of state's prosecution often depends on interrogation Court is
concerned with whether suspect was able to make a free and rational assessment of his own
interests; this emphasis may show different results than an emphasis on police misconduct).
157. 361 U.S. 199 (1960).
158. Id. at 202-03. "[T]he evidence indisputably established the strongest possibility that [the
defendant] was insane and incompetent at the time he ... confessed." Id. at 207.
159. Id. at 204.
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purpose on the part of the police was irrelevant.1 60 Likewise, in Townsend
v. Sain,'6' the Court threw out a confession because the defendant had
been injected with a drug which had the effect of a truth serum,' 62 even
though the questioning officers were unaware that the defendant had been
given a drug.' 63 The Townsend Court held that any questioning which
produces a confession that is not the product of free intellect renders the
confession inadmissible. 6
In light of Blackburn and Townsend, Connelly's initial statements should
be inadmissible. These two cases indicate that, even in the absence of police
misconduct, a statement may still be inadmissible if it is not the product
of a person's free intellect or free will. The trial court's finding in Connelly
strongly suggests that the defendant was in fact insane at the time he
confessed. Arguably Connelly's statements were not a product of his free
will and, as the trial court found, should not have been admitted into
evidence. This is one example of the effect the Court's new standard will
have in state confession cases.
The Connelly majority next contended that police misconduct is not only
a prerequisite, but the only type of state action that can violate due process
in the area of confessions. 65 Again the assertion is unfounded. In the first
state confession case that the Supreme Court decided, 66 the Court held
that any state agency, not only the police, could offend due process by
obtaining or using a confession. 6 7 Although prior case law almost always
involved police misconduct as the state action in question, no court prior
to Connelly held that police were the only relevant state offenders in
confession cases.
2. Mental state and free will
The Connelly majority, by failing to consider the defendant's mental
illness, completely ignored the Colorado courts' findings that the defendant
did not exercise his free will when he chose to speak to the police. 6s The
Connelly Court asserted that free will has no place in the voluntariness
standard. 69 Contrary to Chief Justice Rehnquist's assertion, however, free
160. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 309 (1963).
161. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
162. Id. at 307-08.
163. Id. at 308. "It is not significant that the drug may have been administered and the
questions asked by persons unfamiliar with [the drug's] properties as a 'truth serum' if the
properties exist." Id.
164. Id.
165. Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 520.
166. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
167. Id. at 286. "The due process clause requires 'that state action, whether through one
agency or another, shall be consistent with the fundamental principles of liberty and justice
.... 1 " Id. (quoting Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)).
168. People v. Connelly, 702 P.2d 722, 725 (Colo. 1985).
169. Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 523.
[Vol. 37:259
19881 COLORADO V. CONNELL Y
will has had an important place in confession law for many years,1 70 and
the Supreme Court has in fact determined confessions to be involuntary
based primarily on the mental state of a defendant. 171
If the Colorado Supreme Court erred, as the Connelly majority contends,
by importing notions of free will into its analysis, 172 then a court can err
by following Supreme Court precedent. In a 1986 state confession case,
the Supreme Court defined voluntary as a "product of a free and deliberate
choice.' '1 73 And in a 1985 decision, the Court found a confession invol-
untary because it was unlikely that it was the product of free and rational
will. 174 The notion of free will has been a part of confession law for many
years and, in fact, it has determined whether or not a finding of volun-
tariness was made. 17 Therefore, Chief Justice Rehnquist's statement that
notions of free will have no constitutional significance in confession law
is unfounded.
In light of past decisions, Connelly's initial statements should have been
found involuntary. As the dissent noted, the trial court found that he did
not exercise his free will when he spoke to the police. 176 Although there
was no police misconduct, the statements could still be involuntary. 77 The
defendant in Connelly had a mental condition strikingly similar to the
defendant's condition in Blackburn, 178 whose statements were found to be
involuntary. The defendant in Blackburn was arrested shortly after a
robbery. 79 A short time after his confession, Blackburn exhibited symptoms
of insanity. 180 The court ordered a psychiatric examination and the doctors
170. See supra notes 6-7, 128-32 and accompanying text. See also Grano, Voluntariness, Free
Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REv. 859, 868-69 (1979) ("Beginning with its very
first confession case ... the Supreme Court has premised [the] voluntariness doctrine on a
postulate of free will. The Court has stressed on numerous occasions that a confession is
voluntary only if the accused is not deprived of freedom of the will.").
171. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 308 (1961) (defendant was given a drug with the
properties of truth serum and questioning officers were unfamiliar with the drug's qualities). See
Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960) (defendant's insanity and incompetence rendered
his confession involuntary).
172. Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 523.
173. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986).
174. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 110 (1985), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 585 (1986). See also
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 401 (1978) (defendant's statements were not the product of
his free and rational choice).
175. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 321 (1963) (fact that defendant was injected with a
drug was vital to whether his confession was the product of free will and was therefore
inadmissible).
176. Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 525 n.4. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). The trial court found that there was "no question that the Defendant did
not exercise free will in choosing to talk to the police." Id.
177. See supra notes 156-64 and accompanying text. See also United States v. Silva, 418 F.2d
328, 330 (2d Cir. 1969) (confession or waiver cannot be termed voluntary if made by a person
whose mental condition rendered it most probably not an act of volition).
178. 361 U.S. at 202.
179. Id. at 201.
180. Id.
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found reasonable grounds to believe that he was insane at the time he
confessed.'"' Blackburn was then found unfit to stand trial and was com-
mitted to a hospital until he was found fit to stand trial four years later.'8 2
Connelly also had a history of mental illness, a fact known by the police,
and he too was most likely insane at the time he confessed. 83 Yet, even in
light of Blackburn, the Supreme Court refused to consider his mental
illness in its voluntariness determination. The Court merely reversed the
Colorado Supreme Court's decision and neglected to articulate any sub-
stantive reasons why the Court was now willing to accept an insane person's
confession when it had never done so before.
Justice Stevens stated in his concurrence that, although he agreed with
the Colorado courts that the pre-custodial statements were involuntary, the
use of them did not violate the fifth amendment because they were not the
product of state compulsion. 8 4 Justice Stevens was correct. The use of the
statement did not violate the fifth amendment because fifth amendment
Miranda protections only apply to confessions which are the product of
custodial interrogation.' 5 In Brown,'8 6 however, the Court indicated that
the use of involuntary confessions as evidence is a denial of due process
under the fourteenth amendment.8 7 In other words, an examination under
the fourteenth amendment which is the basis of the voluntariness test,
would have determined that Connelly's confession was inadmissible.
B. Post-Custodial/Miranda Waiver
The statements made by Connelly after he had been taken into custody
fell under the rules of Miranda.'88 Since the record showed that Connelly
was read his rights, the only question that remained was whether he validly
waived his rights before he continued to make inculpatory statements.'8 9
Confessions are prima facie involuntary and the prosecution has a heavy
burden of showing that a Miranda waiver is freely and voluntarily made. 90
181. Id. The defendant was diagnosed as having a schizophrenic reaction, paranoid type. Id.
at 202.
182. Id. at 201-02.
183. See supra notes 79-92 and accompanying text.
184. Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 524 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
185. See supra note 60. See also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966) (volunteered
statements are not barred by the fifth amendment and their admissibility is not affected by the
Miranda decision).
186. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936).
187. Id. at 286. See also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978) (it is a denial of due
process of law to use defendant's involuntary statement against him in a criminal trial).
188. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
189. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444 (police must read defendant his Miranda warnings
as soon as they take him into custody and prior to asking him any questions; defendant may
effectively waive his rights only if waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently).
190. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 483 (1981).
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Since custodial interrogation is inherently coercive,'91 courts must indulge
in every reasonable presumption against the waiver. 192 A Miranda waiver
must be a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent relinquishment or abandon-
ment of a defendant's rights. 93
The voluntary' 94 portion of a Miranda waiver requires an inquiry into
whether a defendant was coerced to confess.' 9 On the other hand, for a
defendant to knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights, he
actually must be aware of and understand the rights he has and the
consequences of waiving them. 196 Chief Justice Rehnquist cited Miranda
for the proposition that a valid waiver must at least be "voluntary."'1 97 He
failed to mention, however, that the waiver must be knowing and intelligent
as well. 198
The three requirements for a valid Miranda waiver were examined by
the Supreme Court most recently in Moran v. Burbine. 199 The Moran Court
described a valid waiver as having two distinct dimensions.2°° First, the
relinquishment of the right must be voluntary in that it is the product of
free and deliberate choice rather than coercion. 20 1 Second, a knowing and
intelligent waiver requires that it is made with full awareness of the nature
of the rights being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to
abandon those rights. 20 2 A court may properly conclude that the Miranda
rights are waived only if the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation reveals both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of
comprehension. 20 3 As it did with the voluntariness analysis of Connelly's
191. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 458.
192. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404-05 (1977) (no waiver found when defendant told
police he would tell them "the whole story" after he consulted with his lawyer but police elicited
incriminating statements before he met with his lawyer).
193. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
194. The Supreme Court's description of the voluntary component of the waiver of Miranda
rights closely resembles that of the traditional due process voluntariness of confessions which
requires the exercise of a rational intellect and free will. Therefore, any determination of whether
a waiver is voluntary can be referenced to those situations where a confession is voluntary in a
due process sense. Brief for Respondent at 27-28, Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. 515 (1986)
(No. 85-660).
195. LAFAvE, supra note 3, § 6.9(c), at 527-28.
196. LAFAvE, supra note 3, § 6.9(b), at 527.
197. Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 523.
198. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444 (waiver must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent).
See supra note 53.
199. 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966)).
200. Id. at 421.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. See also Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979) (totality of circumstances
approach mandates inquiry into all circumstances surrounding interrogation to determine whether
defendant had capacity to understand the warnings, the nature of his fifth amendment rights,
and the consequences of waiving those rights).
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pre-custodial statements, 204 the Supreme Court completely ignored the sub-
jective inquiry into whether Connelly was capable of understanding his
rights and the consequences of waiving them. The Court focused only on
police misconduct.
1. Voluntary
Chief Justice Rehnquist examined only the voluntariness of the waiver
for compulsion caused by police misconduct 05 He stated that free will has
no place in determining the waiver issue2°6 and that the voluntariness of a
waiver has always depended on the absence of police wrongdoing, not on
free choice. 27 The Court's finding, that Connelly validly waived his Mir-
anda rights, is at odds with prior Supreme Court decisions. The Moran20 1
majority, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, defined voluntary as "the
product of free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion or
deception. ' 20 9 It stated that only if the totality of the circumstances reveals
both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension could
a court properly find a valid Miranda waiver.210
Because the Connelly Court held that a waiver is voluntary unless there
is police misconduct, 21' the definition of free and deliberate choice becomes
any confession given under custodial interrogation in the absence of police
misconduct. Although police misconduct is probably the most common
type of coercion, prior case law required an inquiry into the totality of the
circumstances. 2 2 When dealing with an average person, such an inquiry
will be simple. When dealing with an insane person, however, other cir-
cumstances should be considered as important sources of coercion. Argu-
ably Connelly's hallucinations coerced him into confessing. Although normal
persons do not face such obscure forces, the fourteenth amendment test
based on the totality of the circumstances should require an examination
into such forces, especially when the evidence establishes that a defendant
was insane at the time he confessed. By restricting the inquiry to an
examination of police misconduct, the Connelly Court stripped protections
from the mentally ill and others of lesser capacity.2"3 The Connelly standard
204. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
205. Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 523-24. "The voluntariness of a waiver has always
depended ... on the absence of police overreaching, not on 'free choice' . Id. at 523.
206. Id. at 523.
207. Id.
208. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
209. Id. at 421.
210. Id.
211. Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 523.
212. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. at 421.
213. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 458 ("Unless adequate protective devices are employed
to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the
defendant can truly be the product of his free choice.") (emphasis added).
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provides adequate protection to the average individual by limiting coercion
to police misconduct. But, by failing to examine each situation subjectively,
an insane defendant who may experience coercion that does not rise to the
level of misconduct is left without adequate protection. As the Court stated
in Miranda, custodial interrogation contains "inherently compelling" pres-
sures which work to undermine an individual's will to resist and cause him
to speak where he would not otherwise do So.2 14 A mentally ill person's
ability to resist coercion may be significantly inferior to that of the average
person and, under Connelly, the mentally ill person may not receive ade-
quate safeguards. Unfortunately, the Court gave no explanation why it set
such a rigid standard for the voluntary prong of a Miranda waiver, except
to note that prior case law had always inquired into police misconduct. 215
2. Knowingly and intelligently
In order to protect a defendant against the inherent pressures of custodial
interrogation, he must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights.216
The prosecution has an affirmative duty to demonstrate a knowing and
intelligent waiver with some showing that a suspect was capable of under-
standing his rights. 217 The Colorado Supreme Court followed precedent
and held that the defendant's Miranda waiver was invalid because the state
was unable to meet its burden of proof. 218
The Connelly majority disagreed with the Colorado Supreme Court and
reversed the decision. The majority ignored prior state confession cases
and its holding does not follow Supreme Court precedent. The Connelly
Court reduced the scope of inquiry for determining whether or not a
Miranda waiver is valid. Connelly diminished the Miranda waiver inquiry
by holding that, once Miranda warnings are given, only police misconduct
during custodial interrogation can render a Miranda waiver invalid. Prior
to Connelly, the knowing and intelligent prongs of a valid Miranda waiver
were satisfied only if the totality of the circumstances showed that a
defendant understood both what his rights were and what the consequences
214. Id. at 467.
215. Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 520 n.1. As the dissent pointed out, fact that all
prior confession cases had an element of police misconduct only means this is a case of first
impression. Id. at 527-28 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
216. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374 (1979) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 467 (1966)). See also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65 (1938) ("The purpose
of the constitutional guaranty of a right to counsel is to protect an accused from a conviction
resulting from his own ignorance of his legal and constitutional rights .... ).
217. Tague v. Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469, 470-71 (1980) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 475 (1966)).
218. People v. Connelly, 702 P.2d 722, 725-26 (Colo. 1985) (because defendant's psychosis
compelled him to follow mandate of God and confess crime rather than kill himself, prosecution
has not carried its burden of proving that defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently
waived his Miranda rights).
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of abandoning them would be.219 Now courts are instructed only to deter-
mine if the Miranda warnings were given to a defendant, without regard
to whether he understood them. Once the court determines that the rights
were given, Connelly holds that only police misconduct can render a
Miranda waiver invalid.
This unarticulated change flies in the face of the Miranda doctrine and
subsequent Supreme Court cases that required waivers be knowing and
intelligent. For example, the Supreme Court in Edwards v. Arizona,2 0
reversed the Arizona Supreme Court's finding of a voluntary waiver because
the state court found the defendant's waiver voluntary "without separately
focusing on whether [the defendant] had knowingly and intelligently [waived
his rights]. ' 221 In essence, the Edwards Court scoffed at the Arizona court
for doing exactly what the majority did in Connelly. The Court merely
examined whether Connelly had been told of his rights and whether there
was evidence of police misconduct. Unfortunately, the Court completely
ignored the issue of whether Connelly understood his rights and the con-
sequences of relinquishing them.
When the Court laid out the Miranda rule, it commented that the warning
was needed to make a defendant aware, not only of his constitutional
privileges, but also of the consequences of waiving those privileges. 222 Only
when a court inquires into a defendant's awareness of the consequences of
waiving his rights can there be any assurance that he understood and
intelligently exercised his privileges.233 The express intent of Miranda, that
a defendant intelligently exercise his privileges, has virtually been abolished
because the Connelly decision now requires courts to find Miranda waivers
invalid only if there is police misconduct. Under Connelly, if the courts
do not find police misconduct, the waiver is valid whether or not a
defendant actually understood his rights. The Connelly majority offered
no explanation for its decision to completely change the standard for a
valid waiver of Miranda rights.
219. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
220. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
221. Id. at 483. "[Hlowever sound the conclusion of the state courts as to the voluntariness
of Edward's admission may be, neither [of the state courts] undertook to focus on whether [the
defendant] understood his right to counsel and intelligently and knowingly relinquished it. It is
thus apparent that the decision below misunderstood the requirement for finding a valid waiver
•.. once invoked." Id. at 484 (emphasis added). See also Tague v. Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469,
471 (1980) (valid waiver decision reversed because there was no evidence that defendant knowingly
and intelligently waived his rights); Moore v. Ballone, 658 F.2d 218, 229 (4th Cir. 1981) (evidence
of defendant's mental condition alone should have sufficed for court to have determined that
defendant could not have knowingly and intelligently waived his rights); Eisen v. Picard, 452
F.2d 860 (1st Cir. 1971) (while police coercion is relevant, court failed to take into account that
defendant's insanity may have deprived him of his freedom of choice, which is the essence of a
voluntary confession), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).




In this one decision, the Miranda safeguards are narrowed to the extent
that they no longer afford adequate protection. The "free will" rationale
that Chief Justice Rehnquist said the respondent would have the Court
adopt 224 is merely the standard the Court has used since the day Miranda
was decided. Now, under Connelly, the Court holds that a confession will
be valid under both the due process voluntariness standard and the Miranda
waiver doctrine unless a defendant can show police misconduct or coer-
cion. 22 A valid Miranda waiver no longer requires an inquiry into whether
a defendant understood his rights and the consequences of abandoning
them. This ignores the fact that a subjective inquiry was part of the Court's
express intent in Miranda v. Arizona.226
The Connelly decision represents still another attempt by the Supreme
Court to limit the substantive protections of Miranda. Just two years
before the Connelly decision, the Court created a "public safety" exception
to Miranda in New York v. Quarles.227 In Quarles, a police officer entered
a supermarket in pursuit of an alleged rapist. When the officer accompanied
by three other officers apprehended the suspect, he noticed an empty gun
holster on the defendant and questioned the defendant without advising
him of his Miranda rights. The suspect told the officers where he hid the
gun. 228 The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision to suppress
the statement and all subsequent statements due to the Miranda violation.
Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the majority, reasoned that this new ex-
ception to Miranda was motivated by a concern for public safety.2 29 The
Quarles decision created a balancing approach to determine the admissi-
bility of alleged coerced confessions, even though such a balancing ap-
proach was specifically rejected in Miranda.2 0 The Miranda decision created
an objective standard to be applied to all statements obtained during
custodial interrogation and the Quarles decision resulted in the first excep-
tion to Miranda's per se exclusionary rule. 3 '
224. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
225. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
226. See Note, supra note 45, at 254-55.
The goals of deterring improper police conduct and obtaining reliable testimonial
evidence, previously motivating the Court under the coerced confession doctrine,
were not seen by the Miranda Court as primary purposes for protecting the privilege
against self incrimination .... [T]he result in Miranda may be explained on the
basis of the Court's preference for those values perceived as inherent in the fifth
amendment [sic], safeguarding an accusatorial criminal justice system and preserving
individual dignity and free will, over ... deterring illegal police behavior ....
(footnotes omitted).
Id.
227. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
228. Id. at 652.
229. Id. at 655-56.
230. Note, supra note 45, at 264-67.
231. Id. at 264.
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This trend continued with the Court's decision in Oregon v. Elstad.232
The Court in that case held that a suspect in custody, who makes incrim-
inating statements before receiving his Miranda warnings, may subsequently
give a valid confession after properly receiving the warnings. 2 11 Justice
O'Connor, speaking for the majority, concluded that the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine 23 4 did not apply to a second voluntary confession
where the initial confession was obtained without Miranda warnings. 235
Thus, although the suspect's initial, unwarned admission must be sup-
pressed under Miranda, his subsequent statement, even if identical to the
previous statement, is not excluded. 23 6 The Elstad and Quarles decisions
depart from the underlying values of both Miranda and the fifth amend-
ment. 237
The Connelly decision followed the lead of Quarles and Elstad. The
Miranda decision set out specific objectives to combat the inherently co-
ercive atmosphere of custodial interrogation. It required that a waiver must
be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent to be valid. 238 The Miranda Court
created this objective standard so that each suspect would be assured of
understanding his rights and the consequences of abandoning them. 23 9 The
Connelly decision removes this vital protection so that a suspect's under-
standing of his rights is irrelevant to the validity of his waiver. Once the
suspect has been advised of his rights, the only relevant concern that
remains is whether there was police misconduct that coerced the suspect to
speak. The Court's gradual attack on the Miranda bright line presumption
suggests the Court's desire to return to a pre-Miranda case-by-case inquiry,
precisely the evil Miranda sought to remove from confession cases.
IV. IMPACT
Connelly substantially changes state confession law because it requires
that a defendant prove police misconduct as a predicate to finding a
confession involuntary and a Miranda waiver invalid. This decision now
defines confessions by mentally ill persons and those individuals coerced
by forces other than police misconduct as voluntary without regard to a
232. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
233. Id. at 318.
234. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (evidence and witnesses discovered
as a result of search in violation of fourth amendment must be excluded).
235. 470 U.S. at 305-12.
236. See Comment, The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, 99 HAiv. L. Rv. 120, 147 (1985)
(police can elicit same statements by prompting suspects to repeat their confessions after tardy
administration of the warnings).
237. See Note, supra note 45, at 275; see also Comment, supra note 236, at 148-49 (basis for
Miranda bright line presumption suggests that both direct and derivative fruits of Miranda
violations should be excluded).
238. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 70, 72-73 and accompanying text.
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defendant's free will. Connelly takes protections away from all suspects,
especially from the mentally ill who need them most. This decision creates
a rigid standard that only considers police misconduct in a voluntariness
determination. Thus, certain forms of coercion that affect the mentally ill
and would have been examined under the totality of the circumstances test,
are no longer considered. The effect in the present case is clear. For
example, from Connelly's perspective, his choice between waiving or ex-
ercising his rights was the same as choosing between life or death. In
essence, he had no choice at all. Courts prior to Connelly would have
considered this factor and most likely would have suppressed the confes-
sion. The Supreme Court, however, found Connelly's confession voluntary
and his Miranda waiver valid.
The decision in Connelly creates another problem because the reliability
of this new class of voluntary confessions is questionable. In recent years,
the Court was not primarily concerned with the reliability of confessions
because all coerced confessions or those made in the absence of a defen-
dant's free and rational choice were excluded as involuntary.2 40 Now, by
narrowing the scope of involuntariness, courts will allow more confessions
of questionable reliability to be used as evidence against defendants. Ad-
mitting more confessions undoubtedly will create a greater number of
convictions. Concern over the increased use of such confessions is especially
important for cases like Connelly's because, as the trial court found, there
was no corroborative evidence linking him to the killing. 241 The only
evidence the prosecution had was Connelly's confession.24 2 In other words,
without the confession, the prosecution would have had no evidence with
which to convict Connelly.
The requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver was an attempt to
insure that all confessors would not make a statement without appreciating
their rights and the consequences of waiving those rights. The requirement
actually protected the fundamental right to be free from testifying against
one's self and the right to have an attorney present during questioning.
After Connelly, these rights are only superficially protected. Only when a
confession is the product of police misconduct will the confession be held
involuntary. The impact on the state courts, therefore, will be significant
240. Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 532 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
241. Id. at 530.
[T]he record is barren of any corroboration of the mentally ill defendant's confession.
No physical evidence links the defendant to the alleged crime. Police did not identify
the alleged victim's body as the woman named by the defendant. Mr. Connelly
identified the alleged scene of the crime, but it has not been verified that the
unidentified body was found there or that a crime actually occurred there. There is
not one shred of competent evidence in this record linking the defendant to the
charged homicide.
Id.
242. Id. at 530 (Brennan, J., dissenting). "Triers of fact accord confessions . . . heavy weight
.... No other class of evidence is so profoundly prejudicial." Id.
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because more confessions will be admissible at a cost to the rights of the
accused.
Finally, the Connelly decision along with the Quarles and Elstad deci-
sions, have significantly reduced the Miranda protections to the extent that
the intended objectives of the Miranda decision can no longer be signifi-
cantly achieved. Furthermore, the current trend that creates exceptions to
the Miranda doctrine has opened a floodgate to other exceptions which
will undoubtedly follow. As a result, it is possible that in the near future
all that will remain of the Miranda decision is its name.
The Court should return to the totality of the circumstances inquiry for
both the due process voluntariness test and the voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent standard for valid Miranda waivers. By moving away from these
standards, the Court has cut back on the constitutional rights that protect
the accused. In a situation like Connelly, where an officer knows that the
defendant has had prior medical treatment, a lawyer should automatically
be appointed. Without this added protection, there is no guarantee that a
mentally deficient person will be fully aware of his rights and the conse-
quences of relinquishing those rights.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court, in Colorado v. Connelly, significantly limited the
protections afforded to individuals who have confessed to criminality. The
Court now requires police misconduct as a prerequisite to either a finding
of an involuntary confession or an invalid waiver of Miranda rights. The
outcome is likely to be that confessions of those who are mentally ill or
otherwise of lesser capacity will more readily be considered voluntary,
whereas before they were held inadmissible. In the same manner, the states'
burden of proof for a valid Miranda waiver will be significantly easier to
establish because any waiver in the absence of police coercion is now
automatically effective. The inevitable result is an increase in the number
of convictions of mentally disabled persons.243 In a civilized society, such
a result is contrary to even the most rudimentary sense of justice.
James Reinfranck
243. On October 27, 1987, Mr. Connelly pleaded guilty to second degree murder and received
a sentence concession of twelve years and one day. Connelly will be civilly committed when he
is released on parole.
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